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Resumo: 
Estudos prévios focam-se, essencialmente, em analisr o risco de crédito na perspectiva do banco, 
quando investigam a relação entre o cliente e este. Contrariamente, este paper pretende desenvolver 
um modelo de credit scoring que possa ser usado pelas P quenas e Médias Empresas (PMEs) e que 
melhore o seu conhecimento sobre o risco de incumprimento. Usando dados de 1260 PMEs 
Portuguesas que operam no sector transformador durante o período de 1998 a 2006, os resultados 
do modelo mostram que a probabilidade de cumprimento no próximo ano é uma função crescente 
da rentabilidade, liquidez, cobertura e actividade e uma função decrescente do endividamento. 
Tendo em conta os factores qualitativos, os resultados indicam que as pequenas empresas e 
empresas com apenas uma relação bancária têm uma elevada probabilidade de incumprimento. A 
análise dos factores de qualidade de gestão e de propriedade mostram que as empresas onde o 
proprietário é simultaneamente o gestor e empresas não familiares são mais seguras 
financeiramente em termos de probabilidade de cumprimento.  
 
Abstract: 
Previous studies focus on modelling credit default in he bank perspective when analysing the 
bank-customer relationship. Inversely, this paper aims to develop a credit scoring model that could 
be used by SMEs, and that improves their knowledge about their default risk. Using data of 1260 
Portuguese Manufacturing SMEs, over the period of 1998-2006, the results show that the 
probability of non-default is an increasing function f profitability, liquidity, coverage and activity, 
and a decreasing function of leverage. Concerning qualitative factors, the results report that smaller 
firms and firms with just one bank relationship have a higher probability of default. The analysis of 
management quality and ownership factors demonstrate th t firms where the owner is at the same 
time the manager and non-family firms are more financi lly secure in terms of the Probability of 
Non-Default. Moreover, the performance and qualitative measures for the model developed show 
that the model is accurate. 
 
JEL Classification: C10; G21; G33. 
 




1. Introduction  
 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a fundamental role in the economy of 
many countries all over the world (Saurina and Trucharte, 2004; Altman and Sabato, 
2005). According to Craig et al. (2007) they are an incubator of economic growth, a place 
where innovation occurs and new ideas become economically viable business enterprises. 
Therefore, SMEs make a significant contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
and to the sustainability of the employment levels. In 2007, for European Union (EU) 
members, the percentage of SMEs was about 99%, producing two-thirds of the total jobs in 
the private sector (Audretsch et al., 2009). In Portugal, they have a weight of 99.6% in the 
business structure, creating 75.2% of private employment and making more than half of 
business (56.4%) (IAPMEI, 2008). Thanks to the simple structure of SMEs, they can 
respond quickly to changing economic conditions and meet local customers’ needs, 
growing sometimes into large and powerful corporatins or failing in a short time (Altman 
and Sabato, 2005). 
 
But, for growing into large and powerful corporations, SMEs need to obtain financial 
funds. In this sense, the vast majority of small businesses rely on commercial banks as 
their primary loan lenders (Berger and Udell, 1998; Wu et al., 2008), since equity 
financing is hardly a viable alternative. This happens because the equity market for small 
firms is not well developed, most owners/managers lack the experience and expertise to 
obtain equity financing and raising equity is rather costly and therefore inefficient for 
smaller financing volumes (Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). 
 
Nevertheless, sometimes financial institutions hesitate to lend funds to SMEs due to lack of 
credible information about them (Baas and Schrooten, 2006; Berger and Frame, 2007; 
Craig et al., 2007; Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). Most SMEs are relatively young, have 
little or no credit history (Craig et al., 2007), and face some difficulties signalling their 
qualities to commercial banks in order to obtain fiancial funds (Steijvers and 
Voordeckers, 2009; Wu et al., 2008; Okura, 2009). These difficulties are classic 
information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders (Farinha and Santos, 2002; Craig 
et al., 2007; Vos et al., 2007) which may give rise to credit rationing, adverse selection and 
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moral hazard problems (Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). According to Petersen and 
Rajan (1994) the causes of those problems may be mor  pr minent when firms are younger 
and small. So, capital market imperfections exist and limit the availability of finance to 
small firms (Love, 2003; Cowling, 2009). 
 
In order to solve market imperfections, firms can develop a relationship lending with 
lenders (Ogawa and Suzuki, 2000; Jacobson et al., 2005; Baas and Schrooten, 2006; 
Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). Normally this relationship is characterized by a 
Housebank which can be defined as the first and sometimes the only lender to a firm (Elsas 
and Krahnen, 1998; Farinha and Santos, 2002; Behr and Güttler, 2007, Neuberger et al., 
2008). Though, the Housebank can lead to hold-up problems. In other words, the lender 
can monopolize firms’ information and changes loan interest rates, which will not reflect 
the real loan risk (Farinha and Santos, 2002; Neuberger et al., 2008). In order to solve the 
hold-up problems, firms can decide on multiple bank relationships (Farinha and Santos, 
2002). But this situation will imply higher interest rates as the new lender doesn’t have 
credible information about the borrower (Behr and Güttler, 2007). 
 
Thus, instead of developing relationships lending, the SMEs can initial a transaction 
lending (Neuberger et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2008). The use of a transactional lending 
technology like credit scoring models is relatively new, but is a growing practice in the 
area of SMEs lending. The adoption of scoring models as management tools has 
significantly altered the way banks deal with their SMEs loan portfolio. This is an 
important issue nowadays because of the introduction of the New Basel Capital Accord 
(Basel II) (Glennon and Nigro, 2005). Under the Basel II, banks are able to compute the 
minimum capital requirements using an Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach which is 
founded on the most sophisticated credit risk internal models (Dietsch and Petey, 2002). In 
line with Haber (2007) most banks choose to implement the IRB approach, because it is in 
their interest to assess the credit risk of their customers as precisely as possible.  
 
The adoption of Basel II in EU was made by the publication of Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC, June 14, that changed the Directives 2000/12/EC and 93/6/EC, respectively. 
These Directives were transposed to the Portuguese law ntered into force in 2007. Since 
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the adoption of the new regulatory framework was optional in 2007, its implementation by 
the majority of Portuguese banks only took place in 2008 (Antão and Lacerda, 2008). 
 
Currently, another relevant issue is the global financial crisis and the “collapse” of 
financial system which took place in the second half of 2008. This situation is followed by 
an economic slow-down or even recession in some Member States of EU. Consistent with 
Audretsch et al. (2009), this crisis can have an adverse effect on SMEs access to bank 
financing. The firms with the weakest financial structure and lower credit rating, like 
SMEs, suffer the most. Remembering that SMEs are more dependent on external sources 
of finance, it is expected that the current financil risis have a strong impact on this type 
of firms. According to Banco de Portugal (2010), in the first quarter of 2010, the criteria 
for lending to non-financial firms have become more rigorous, increasing the degree of 
contraction and focusing in the long-term credit and in the SME segment. 
 
Based on above arguments, the objective of this paper is to develop a logit scoring model 
for the prediction of the probability of default by Portuguese SMEs. Commonly, 
researchers focus on the bank’s behaviour when analysi g the bank-customer relationship. 
This paper pretends to do the opposite that is helping SMEs creating an adequate credit 
scoring model. Thus, the main contribution of this paper is to help SMEs to gain 
knowledge about their default risk, which can be usd to approximate their risk adequate 
cost of debt. This knowledge is likely to lead to a detection of hold-up problems that SMEs 
might be confronted with their bank relationships. Further it allows them to monitor their 
bank’s pricing behaviour and it reduces information asymmetries between lenders and 
borrowers. To assess a distress prediction model this paper uses a logit regression 
technique on panel data to estimate a one-year default prediction model. The objective is to 
modelling credit risk for SMEs separately from large corporate. Thus, data of 1260 
Portuguese SMEs operating in manufacturing sector ove the period of 1998-2006 was 
collected.  
 
The results show that the probability of non-default within the next year is an increasing 
function of profitability, liquidity, coverage and activity, and a decreasing function of 
leverage. Concerning qualitative factors, the results report that smaller firms and firms with 
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just one bank relationship have a higher probability of default.  Moreover, the results also 
show that firms that have more collateral to pledge to the bank have a lower probability of 
default. The analysis of management quality and ownership factors showed that firms 
where the owner is at the same time the manager and no -family firms are more financially 
secure in terms of the Probability of Non-Default. Concerning to predictive factors, the 
results reported by the variable Failure Score show that firms with a higher probability of 
end activity with loss over the next twelve months have a higher probability of default. The 
results of the variable Paidex show that when the average delay of payments is lower than 
30 days, the probability of Non-Default is higher. Moreover, the performance and 
qualitative measures for the model developed show tat the model is accurate. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretical background about credit 
rationing and relationship lending and The New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II). Section 3 
provides a description of dataset, methods and variables. Section 4 discusses the results. 
Section 5 concludes with a summary of the main findings and the limitations of the study 
as well as prospects for further investigations. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Credit Rationing and Relationship Lending 
 
Bank loans are the most widely used form of small and new business financing. Although, 
the exchange relationship between lenders and borrowe s often suffers from market 
imperfections, such as, information asymmetries (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Craig et al., 
2007; Freel, 2007; Blumberg and Letterie, 2008; Steijvers, 2008; Cowling, 2009). These 
information asymmetries occur because the lenders have little and no reliable information 
about the default risk of the applicants (Afonso and Aubyn, 2002).  According to Carling 
and Lundberg (2005) the degree of information asymmetry is lower if the bank has good 
knowledge about the local market on which a potential borrowing firm acts and if bank 




Nevertheless, smaller firms often have difficulties to signal their qualities to financial 
institutions in order to obtain bank finance (Blumberg and Letterie, 2008; Steijvers, 2008; 
Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). Smaller firms are mainly non listed firms, not followed 
by analysts and lacking any audited financial statements. Moreover, these firms are not 
always willing to release any information since it is a time-consuming (costly) occupation. 
Normally the quality of the data provided by small business owners for review by banks is 
often poor due to a lack of management experience or staff capable to produce useful 
information (Berger and Udell, 1998; Cziráky et al., 2005; Berger, 2006; Blumberg and 
Letterie, 2008; Wu et al., 2008). This dilemma is the so called opacity problem (Berger and 
Frame, 2007; Neuberger et al., 2008). 
 
This information asymmetry between bank and SMEs could be so severe that could lead to 
credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Trovato and Alfò, 2006; Craig et al., 2007; 
Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). According to Steijvers (2008) the credit rationing is one 
of the most important examples of market failure in our modern economy. It can be 
defined as the situation where the demand for loans exceeds supply at the prevailing 
interest rate (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Afonso and Aubyn, 2002; Cziráky et al., 2005; 
Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). This means that loans are allocated by some mechanism 
other than price (Craig et al., 2007). The rationing of demand may be achieved in two 
ways: either borrower does not receive the full amount of credit they have applied for (the 
so called “type I rationing”) or some of the borrowers are simply turned down (“type II 
rationing”) (Afonso and Aubyn, 2002). 
 
Especially in markets where it is difficult to distinguish between good and bad credit risks, 
these capital market imperfections result in a supply lack of financial funds, so it is 
conceivable that the demand for credit may exceed th  supply in equilibrium (Craig et al., 
2007; Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). If there is an excess demand for bank funds it should 
be expected that banks raise loan price (the interest rate) to equate demand for loans with 
supply, thus increasing profits. But it is well known that in the normal course of bank 
lending this do not happen (Afonso and Aubyn, 2002; Steijvers, 2008; Cowling, 2009). 
They do not have an incentive to raise the interest rates when demand exceeds supply. As 
pointed out by Steijvers (2008:4) “the bank-optimal interest rate is the equilibrium interest 
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rate since at any interest rate above the bank-optimal interest, the expected return for the 
bank increases at a slower rate than the interest rate and will even decrease after a certain 
interest rate is exceeded”.  
 
Consequently, some borrowers that will not receive bank credit are willing to pay a higher 
interest rate. If the bank accepted this higher interest rate this means that higher riskier 
borrowers are attracted. This is the adverse selection effect (Steijvers, 2008; Steijvers and 
Voordeckers, 2009). It is a consequence of different borrowers having different 
probabilities of repaying their loan (Craig et al., 2007). In another words, the adverse 
selection effect means that the borrower quality is ex ante undetectable by the lending bank 
which gives the firm an unfair advantage. Sequentially, banks will not accept the higher 
interest rate because higher risk lending is not expected to be rewarded with higher return. 
On the other hand, if banks raise the interest rate, the borrowers will prefer higher riskier 
projects, which mean that the return of the bank will decrease again. This is the moral 
hazard effect (Cowling and Mitchell, 2003; Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). These 
arguments suggest that the demand will not equal the supply and that the banks will prefer 
to ration credit due to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
 
The expected return to the bank obviously depends o the probability of repayment, so the 
bank would like to be able to identify borrowers who are more likely to repay. But it is 
difficult to identify such borrowers (Craig et al., 2007). The relationship lending might 
serve as a mechanism to mitigate informational asymmetries and thus solving the credit 
rationing problem (Ogawa and Suzuki, 2000; Jacobson et al., 2005; Baas and Schrooten, 
2006; Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). It is often co sidered as the most appropriate 
lending technique for collecting information on SMEs, since reliable information on these 
type of firms is rare and costly (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998): the firm and the bank enter in a 
long-term relationship that assures the firm’s access to credit and gives the bank access to 
information about the firm (Baas and Schrooten, 2006). The relationship lending is mainly 
based in soft information or qualitative data which takes significant time to accumulate and 
it’s not easily observed (Berger, 2006; Berger and Frame, 2007; Wu et al., 2008). This 
lending technology addresses the problem of SMEs’ information opacity (Neuberger et al., 
2008; Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009; Wu et al., 2008). 
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Relationship lending with long-term commitment and i formational monopoly by the 
lender has some relationship with the so-called Housebanking. Normally small firms have 
an exclusive outside financier, their Housebank. It can be defined as the premier lender to a 
firm. It has more relevant and timelier information than other bank and is more committed 
to its client, enlarging their role as financier if the firm faces unexpected and temporary 
difficulties. Nevertheless, the information monopoly f the Housebank potentially poses a 
risk for the borrower, since it is informationally captured by the lender and might lose 
future benefits of an improved creditworthiness (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Farinha and 
Santos, 2002; Behr and Güttler, 2007, Neuberger et al., 2008). In the case of repeated 
lending, the Housebank can extract profits, practicing a higher, not fair, interest rate. This 
situation can occur because, during the relationship lending, the bank accumulates 
privileged information about the firm quality which other potentials lenders doesn’t have 
access to it. If the borrowers try to get financing from another bank it will be refused 
because they assume that it is a bad quality firm snce it could not get financing by the 
Housebank. Therefore, long-term bank relationship could lead to hold-up problems 
(Farinha and Santos, 2002; Neuberger et al., 2008). The main concern is that the firm will 
reduce their investment and thus lower profits (Mahrt-Smith, 2006). As a result, the bank 
relationship may become costly because sub-optimal investments in a relationship. 
 
Initiating a second bank lending relationship could be an optimal solution to the potential 
hold-up problem. According to Neuberger et al. (2008) firms choose multiple banking 
relationships in order to obtain financial services at more competitive terms than at their 
Housebank, which exerts monopoly power in highly concentrated markets. But the new 
lender doesn’t have the same information about the borrower as the Housebank. This 
situation leads to a higher default risk assumed by the new lender and consequently higher 
interest rates for the borrower. These are typically switching costs that firms may be 
confronted when initiating a new relationship lending. Along with Behr and Güttler (2007: 
208), “the borrower will not obtain the “fair” rate of interest - that is, the risk adequate cost 




Beyond relationship lending the bank customer relationship can be also characterized by 
transaction lending which is based primarily on “hard” quantitative data and is focused on 
informationally transparent borrowers (Neuberger et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2008). In line 
with Berger and Udell (2002) transactions lending technologies are distinguished primarily 
by the source and type of information used like financial ratios for financial statement 
lending; the quantity and quality of the available collateral; usually accounts receivable and 
inventory for asset-based lending; and the financial condition and history of the principal 
owner of the firm for small business credit scoring. Therefore, only SMEs with sufficient 
hard information available generally receive transactions credit from banks (Berger, 2006). 
Similar to capital market investors that rely on external credit ratings provided by rating 
agencies, banks assign internal credit ratings to evaluate the creditworthiness of their 
borrowers. In both cases, ratings can be interpreted as a screening technology that is 
applied to alleviate asymmetric information problems between borrowers and lenders. 
Internal credit ratings for corporate borrowers aren aggregated valuation procedure of 
various financial and non-financial factors (Grunert et al., 2005).  
 
Nowadays, the transaction lending technologies are an important issue, not only for 
external credit ratings but also as an internal tool f r banks because of the introduction of 
the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) (Butera and Faff, 2006). Concerns have been 
raised that the Basel II will change the way banks analyse credits, introducing new credit 
risk management techniques, like credit scoring models, and possibly reducing the lending 
activity toward SMEs (Altman and Sabato, 2005). Credit scoring models are generally 
developed by lenders for the purpose of ranking the population by relative credit quality 
similar to the way ratings developed by the rating agencies (Glennon and Nigro, 2005). So, 
any business owner seeking bank financing needs to overcome the hesitation and doubts of 
banks (Blumberg and Letterie, 2008) creating its own internal rating models and analysing 
their probability of default. Thus, if a firm knows it  own creditworthiness, this could lead 
to a fair treatment of SMEs by lenders, possibly reducing the loan interest rate and having 





2.2. The New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) 
 
Basel II is a regulatory framework for the banking sector, which objective is to align 
regulation with best practices in credit risk management (Haber, 2007) and to provide 
banks with an incentive to invest in more sophisticated risk measurement and management 
capabilities (Herring, 2007). It consists of three Pillars: Pillar I, Minimum Capital 
Requirements (credit risk, operational risk, market risk); Pillar II, Supervisory Review 
Process, and Pillar III, Market Discipline (Mohanty, 2008).  
 
In Pillar 1 of the Basel II, the rules to calculate bank capital requirements for each of the 
different segments are clearly explained. The banks can use the Standardized Approach 
(RSA) and the Internal Ratings-Based Approach (IRB) (the Foundation (FIRB) or the 
Advanced (AIRB)), to calculate capital requirements (Altman and Sabato, 2005; Jacobson 
et al., 2005; Haber, 2007; Herring, 2007; Jarrow, 2007; Mohanty, 2008). With the IRB 
approach, banks are able to personalize the capital requirement calculation, building their 
own models in order to estimate Probabilities of Deaults (PDs) (with the FIRB) or even 
Expected Loss Given Defaults (LGDs), Exposure at Default (EAD) and Maturity (M) 
(with the AIRB) for each client (Altman and Sabato, 2005; Jacobson et al., 2005; Herring, 
2007; Jarrow, 2007). In this sense, the majority of banks choose to implement the AIRB, 
because it is in their interest to assess the credit isk of their customers as precisely as 
possible. 
 
Along with the Basel II banks will have to categorize exposures into five broad classes of 
assets with different underlying risk characteristics: corporate, sovereign, bank, retail, and 
equity exposures (Jacobson et al., 2005). The probability of default is defined to be the one 
year long term average default probability. Default is defined for wholesale and retail 
exposures in Basel II. A wholesale exposure is a credit exposure to a company, individual 
or government entity, and a retail exposure is a credit exposure to an individual or small 
business managed as part of a portfolio of similar exposures (EU, Directive 2006/48/EC). 
A wholesale exposure defaults if either the bank determines the borrower in unlikely to pay 
or the borrower is at least 90 days past due on a coupon or principal payment. A retail 
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exposure defaults if it is 120 days past due (unless it is a revolving retail exposure, then it 
must be 180 days past due) (Jarrow, 2007). 
 
According Basel II retail credit and loans to SMEs will receive a different treatment than 
corporate loans and will require less regulatory capital for given default probabilities. The 
main reasons for this differential treatment is that small business loans and retail credit are 
generally found to be less sensitive to systematic risk and the assumption that the loans 
maturities are shorter (Jacobson et al., 2005). Nevertheless, the New Basel Accord assumes 
that the smaller an obligor, the greater its probability of default (Saurina and Trucharte, 
2004). So, banks are able to consider SMEs as retail or s corporate entities, considering 
the total exposure. If total exposure is under 1 million, SMEs can be classified as retail but 
at the same time the exposure must be managed as a retail exposure, on a pooled basis 
(Fabi et al., 2004; Saurina and Trucharte, 2004; Altman and Sabato, 2005; Claessens et al., 
2005; Jacobson et al., 2005; Haber, 2007). 
 
According to Altman and Sabato (2005) the New Basel Capital Accord will encourage 
banks to update their internal systems and procedures so as to be able to manage SMEs on 
a pooled basis through the use of a scoring, rating or some other automated decision 
system. The same authors pointed out that access to bank financing is likely to become 
easier and possibly cheaper, since larger banks will find SME lending more profitable. 
Berger and Frame (2007) came to the same conclusion. They analysed the potential effects 
of the small business credit scoring on credit avail bil ty and they find that banking 
organizations that implement automated decision system  (such as scoring systems) 
increase small business credit availability. Some authors like Berger (2006) and Kolari and 
Shin (2006) conclude that small business lending has a strong positive effect on bank 
profitability. Divergent from this opinion are Saurina and Trucharte (2004) and Dietsch 
and Petey (2004) that finding that lending to SMEs is riskier than to large corporations. 
 
Taking into account these different results, the introduction of Basel II remains an 
important issue nowadays. Since SMEs play a fundamental role in the economy and with 
the Basel II banks are able to create their own credit scoring models, it is very important 
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that SMEs gains knowledge about their default risk, being better prepared to their 
relationships with the bank. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1. Data Set 
 
A panel dataset of Portuguese SMEs for the period of 1998-2006 was constructed from 
AMADEUS, and from a database required to Dun & Bradstreet (D&B). The first one is a 
database managed by Bureau Van Djik (BVD) which includes standardized annual 
accounts (consolidated and unconsolidated) for approximately 9 millions of companies 
through Europe, including Eastern Europe. D&B is a le der provider of business 
information for risk management, sales and marketing, a d supply management decisions. 
The selected period is due to the fact that de database AMADEUS only have information 
available from 1998 to 2006.  
 
This paper focuses on Portuguese SMEs for several rasons. Portugal has a financial 
system dominated by the presence of financial intermediaries, mostly banks (Bonfim et al., 
2009). Thus the relationships between lenders and borrowers are characterized by 
relationship lending. In this context, SMEs are confr ted with relatively harsh credit 
constraints (Baas and Schrooten, 2006) because they suffer from information asymmetries 
problems. They do not have certified audited financi l statements to yield credible 
financial information on a regular base and usually do not have publicly traded equity or 
debt (Wu et al., 2008). Further, most SMEs are managed by only one manager who owns 
all the shares (Blumberg and Letterie, 2008). So, they are characterized by a lack of 
credible information (Berger and Frame, 2007) having difficulties to signal their qualities. 
Another reason is the fact that the small business sector is an incubator of economic 
growth, being responsible for the creation of majority of private employment and 
contribution to GDP (Saurina and Trucharte, 2004; Craig et al., 2007). As a SME 
classification, this study employs the definition established in the European Commission 
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Recommendation of 6 May 2003 (2003/361/EC)1 and at the same time the one defined in 
the Basel II2. 
 
Consistent with Dragos et al. (2008), the selection of the sample should be the first step 
when estimating firm’s probability of default once it can cause classification and 
estimation biases. To avoid this problem this paper focuses only on one sector, the 
manufacturing sector (NACE, Section C), more specifically the manufacture of Food 
Products (NACE, Division 10) and the Manufacture of Beverages (NACE, Division 11). 
According to Antão e Lacerda (2008), this sector is characterized by a higher default rate. 
One possible explanation is due the fact that the manufacturing sector is a capital intensive 
one which means that requires more investment and once report larger financing obstacles 
(Beck et al., 2006). Nevertheless, these sub-sectors are the major producers of essential 
goods and represented 13.6% in total manufacturing in 2008 (INE, 2008). In 2004, these 
enterprises accounted 16% of turnover and 13% of GVA in manufacturing industry (AEP, 
2007). To control the survivor bias effect, active and inactive firms were selected 
According with Butera and Faff (2006) the balance sh et data used must be at least one or 
two previous to the data on which the probability of default is assessed. Once observing 
this assumption and eliminating firms with too many missing and inconsistent data (e.g. 
total assets are different from total shareholders plu liabilities), at this point the sample of 
this study comprises an unbalanced panel data of 1260 Portuguese SMEs for the period 
between 1998 and 2006.  
 
To get information about the default rate of the select d sample the data was submitted to 
D&B. Data on defaults are difficult to access because they refer to rare events and the data 
is prepared by the entities which themselves are the source of information. Central banks 
have only recently begun to make some efforts in order to copulate a practical loan default 
data, following the recommendations of the New Basel Capital Accord. The final sample 
consists on a pooled panel data with 375 default and 2121 non defaulted observations 
                                                
1 According to the European Commission Recommendation (2003/361/EC) the category of micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is made up of enterpris s which employ fewer than 250 persons and which 
have an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million, and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding 
EUR 43 million. 
2 The New Basel Accord only considers the value of annu l turnover (EUR 50 million) (Saurina and 
Trucharte, 2004).  
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corresponding to a default rate of 15% during the period 1998-2006.3 Table 1 presents the 
results.  
Table 1 
Construction of the data set for the Portuguese Manufacturing Firms 
Defaults Non-Defaults Total % Default
1998 9 112 121 7.44%
1999 2 90 92 2.17%
2000 5 102 107 4.67%
2001 5 100 105 4.76%
2002 6 116 122 4.92%
2003 11 122 133 8.27%
2004 3 137 140 2.14%
2005 113 541 654 17.28%
2006 221 801 1022 21.62%
Total Observations 375 2121 2496 15.02% 
This table shows the construction of the data sample for the Portuguese Manufacturing firms for the period 
1998-2006.  In the first column, the different years e depicted. The second column shows the number of 
defaulted observations and the third column the number of non-defaulted observations. The column four 
shows the total number of observations. The last column shows the percentage of defaulted for each year and 
for total observations. 
 
 




This paper uses the logit regression to analyse the predictors of default by Portuguese 
manufacturing SMEs. According to Lacerda and Moro (2008), the logit model is 
commonly used since its score is calibrated as probability of default (PD). Additionally, 
the logit model allows working with disproportional samples and do not require restrictive 
assumptions (Altman and Sabato, 2007) that is, it does not oblige the assumption of 
multivariate normality of the data (Butera and Faff, 2006)4. 
                                                
3 In order to keep the confidentiality, when we receive the sample from D&B we could not identify the 
enterprises. So, we just could classify the number of default observations. 
4 The seminal works in the field of default predictions studies were Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968), who
developed univariate and multivariate analyses, respectively. Specifically, Altman (1968) combined five 
financial ratios in a linear way with weights to produce what he called the Z-score model. This technique was 
applied to default prediction studies for a long time for some other authors. Nevertheless, the model has been 
criticized because it assumes the normality and the equality of the variance-covariance matrices for 
defaulting and non-defaulting companies. Considering this criticism, Ohlson (1980) applies the logistic 
model to analysing the default probability. 
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The logit model takes the form:  
εββββ +++++=== nnxxxitY ...p(x)-1
p(x)
ln (p(x)) log 22110  (1) 









] is p logit; β0 is the coefficient of the constant term; β (1,..., n) is a vector of 
coefficients of the independent variables; x (1,..., n) is a vector of independent variables; and ε 




3.2.2.1 Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable is the Probability of Non-Defaulted (P-NDF) that takes the value 
of one if the firm non-defaulted and zero otherwise. This study uses as dependent variable 
the P-NDF in order to have positive slopes and intercept since the higher the final logit 
score, the higher the probability that a firm will not default (Altman and Sabato, 2007). 
 
3.2.2.2 Independent Variables 
 
As independent variables, this study comprises at the same time financial (quantitative) 
and non financial (qualitative) factors, because financial ratios are mostly backward 
looking point in time measures. This assumption is consistent with Basel II IRB (BIS, 
2006) approach and, according to Lehmann (2003) and Grunert et al. (2005), the combined 
use of those variables leads to a significantly more accurate default prediction than the 
single use of financial or non-financial factors. Appendixes B and C show the definition 
and statistics of all variables. 
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In line with previous studies5, this study selected six accounting ratio categories: 
profitability, solvency, liquidity, leverage, coverage, and activity. According to Beaver et 
al. (2005) and Grunert et al. (2005), profitability is expected to be a critical element in the 
analysis of the probability of default because it is a key indicator of firms’ ability to pay. 
Profitability is negatively related to credit risk (Doumpos et al., 2002). More profitable 
firms are able to generate larger cash-flows with their activity, and may face lower funding 
costs. Related to this point this study introduces th  solvency category in order to measure 
the capacity of a firm to generate internal funds (e.g., Cánovas and Solano, 2006). Another 
important area in this field is the liquidity of a firm. Firms having enough liquid assets are 
in better liquidity position and are more capable of meeting their obligations (Doumpos et 
al., 2002; Grunert et al., 2005). The leverage ratios are classic indicators of financial risk. 
High values of these ratios indicate a high default probability (Carling and Lundberg, 
2005) since firms have to generate more income to meet their obligations and repay their 
debt (Doumpos et al., 2002). This study also uses th  coverage ratios as higher levels of 
these ones implies lower levels of financial leverag  and thus a lower probability of 
default. Furthermore, this study comprises activity indicators. These ratios allowed to 
measure the effectiveness of investment in a given category of assets (Butera and Faff, 
2006; Altman and Sabato, 2007). 
 
For each one of the categories it was selected a number of financial ratios (see Appendix 
A) as being most used in relevant studies. This study uses a forward stepwise selection 
procedure for each one of the categories in order to identify (statistically) which financial 
indicators are better discriminators between “default” and “non-default” firms. Then the 
model is performed only with the selected ratios. For this study, the significant level is set 
at 20% (e.g., Altman and Sabato, 2007). Table 2 presents the results. All ratios have the 




                                                
5 For example: Beaver (1966); Altman (1968); Doumpos et al. (2002); Altman and Sabato (2005); Beaver et 
al. (2005); Carling and Lundberg (2005); Grunert et al. (2005); Butera and Faff (2006); Cánovas and Solano 
(2006); Altman and Sabato (2007); Behr and Güttler (2007); Cánovas and Solano (2007); Lacerda and Moro 
(2008); Bonfim et al. (2009) and Fidrmuc and Hainz (2009) among others. 
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Table 2 



















Coverage = Operating Profit / Interest Paid 0.013
Activity = Sales / Total Assets 0.145
Liquidity = (Current Assets – Short Term Liabilities) / Total Assets 0.465
Leverage = Debt / Total Assets 1.029
Profitability = Profit (Loss) before Taxation / Total Sales 2.401
Solvency = Cash Flow / Total Assets 1.529
 
This table shows the model developed using the financial ratios to predict the probability of non-default. 
The parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood method. Wald statistics are in parentheses. 
****Significant at 1%; ***Significant at 5%; **Significant at 10%; *Significant at 20%. 
 
Relatively to size, Saurina and Trucharte (2004) and Jacobson et al. (2005) show that the 
smaller an obligor, the greater its probability of default. This assumption is consistent with 
the Basel II (BIS, 2006). Moreover, Dietsch and Petey (2004) distinguished three 
categories of SMEs: the small or very small ones, in which the default risk is lower than in 
the medium-size SMEs; the medium-size SMEs that are riskier, on average; and the largest 
SMEs, where credit risk is lower. Thus, they concluded that on average, the PDs tend to 
vary with size. In the model developed, this study ses the natural logarithm of total annual 
turnover as a measure of firm’s size6. Concerning to the variable size, this study expects a 
positive sign between size and the P-NDF.  
 
Due to acknowledge ‘liabilities of newness’, younger firms are less likely to successfully 
access credit than older firms (Freel, 2007). Consistent with Glennon and Nigro (2005), 
new firms are statistically more likely to default than established firms, as they are 
generally more information opaque, making it more difficult to judge the relative 
                                                
6 The Basel II only considers total annual turnover as a measure of firm’s size (BIS, 2006). 
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creditworthiness of those firms. To analyse this relationship this study employs four 
dummies variables considering four categories of age (see Berger and Udell, 2002).  
 
For collateral this study uses the ratio of Total Tngible Fixed Assets under Total Assets 
(Farinha and Santos, 2002; Bonfim et al., 2009). This is an important issue due to the 
introduction of the New Basel Capital Accord. According to Steijvers and Voordeckers 
(2009), it is expected that collateral based lending will occur more often because the risk of 
lending should be align to the amount of capital a bank has to hold. Thus, a collateralized 
loan represents less risk regarding the recovery of the loan and thus less equity has to be 
reserved by the bank (BIS, 2006). In this sense, only good risk borrowers will be willing to 
put up collateral against a loan, as they feel confide t that they will not default and lose 
their assets. So, a positive sign between collateral and the P-NDF is expected. 
 
Since one objective of this study is to reduce the information asymmetries between SMEs 
and banks it is important to analyse how the opaqueness of a firm influences its probability 
of default. Farinha and Santos (2002) use the ratio between intangible assets under total 
assets as a proxy for firm’s opaqueness. Consistent with Neuberger et al. (2008), industries 
with a large share of physical assets (e.g., manufacturing) tend to be less opaque than 
industries with more intangible assets (e.g., servic s, trade). Thus, this study uses the ratio 
of tangible assets under total assets to measure the firm’s opaqueness. If this ratio is higher 
(near 1) this means that the firm has lower intangible assets and that it is less opaque.  
 
Usually, to overcome the opacity problem, main small and younger firms rely on a close 
bank-customer relationship, having only a low number of lending relationships. Although, 
a single bank relationship is most efficient when a firm borrows once, due to information 
monopoly by the lender, which can lead to hold-up problems. These problems may be 
reduced by multiple bank relationships. So, consistent with Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), 
multiple bank relationships signal higher borrower quality. Other authors like Bhattacharya 
and Chiesa (1995), Yosha (1995), and Carletti (2004), agree that firms with valuable 
information prefer fewer creditors (but more than one) to keep some private information 
(for instance, Bonfim et al. (2009), concluded that Portuguese SMEs borrows from two 
banks on average). In this sense, this study uses the number of bank relationships as a 
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measure of borrower quality and two dummy variables (Bank1 and Bank2) are created to 
analyse the referred effect.  
 
Another important issue is that SMEs are normally owner–managed and the owner-
managers generally possess general rather than specific expertise (Wu et al, 2008). This is 
an important topic because, when the owner is at the same time the manager, the 
information opacity of these firms is higher. According to Schäfer (2003), owner-managed 
enterprises represent a higher statistical risk. However, in cases where the ownership and 
management are separated, managers may invest in projects that benefit their own personal 
interests, rather than developing projects that cano tribute to improve company 
performance. These are typically agency problems between managers and owners 
(Serrasqueiro and Nunes, 2008). One way to overcome this problem is centring decision-
making on company owners or having more than one manager specialized in a given area. 
To measure these effects this study employs the variable Ownership1, a dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 if the business owner is at the same time the manager and 0 
otherwise; and the variable Ownership2, also a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the 
company has more than one manager and 0 otherwise. To analyse the effect of a family on 
firm P-NDF, this study defines the variable Family Firm, a dummy variable that takes the 
value one if the company is controlled and usually managed by multiple family members 
(Shanker and Astrachan, 1996). Normally this type of nterprises faces a higher level of 
commitment to the managerial project for the reason that the subsistence of the family 
depends on the success of the firm (Brokaw, 1992). Behr and Güttler (2007) concluded that 
a single owner, in this situation a family, can be more disposed to provide the firm with 
new equity in an attempt to avoid a loan default. Cabrera-Suárez et al. (2001) argue that 
family firms are more hesitant to invest in risky projects. This could be interpreted in two 
different ways. On one hand, firms could miss growth opportunities, which could mean a 
higher probability of default; and on the other hand, family firms does not assume risky 
projects which could lead to a lower probability of default. So, this study does not predict 
the expected sign between the variable family firms and the P-NDF. 
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Additionally, this study also employs predictive indicators provided by D&B7. Thus, to 
analyse the level of risk associated with the company’s financial capacity this study uses 
the variable Rating; the variable Failure Score measures the probability of a firm ends 
activity with loss over the next twelve months; and the variable Paidex is an indicator that 
measures the average delay of payments from a company in the domestic market (days 




4.1. Univariate Analysis 
 
Appendix C shows measurements and descriptive statistics of Probability of Non-Default 
and Probability of Default firms. Defaulted firms have a lower mean of profitability, 
solvency, liquidity, coverage and activity ratios and a higher mean of leverage ratio than 
non-defaulted firms. Firms that have a higher mean ratio between tangible fixed assets and 
total debt are non-defaulted firms, which mean thatese firms are able to pledge more 
collateral to the bank than defaulted firms.  
 
For non-default and for default observations the majority of the firms have more than 
sixteen years, corresponding to 60% and 51% of the total sample, respectively. Regarding 
the size, the non-default firms are bigger. The mean v lue for size is 14, 301€ for Non-
Defaulted Firms and 13, 813€ for defaulted firms. The sample also shows that 74% of non-
defaulted firms and 68% of defaulted firms have more than one bank relationship. Both for 
non-defaulted and defaulted firms, in the vast majority of the firms the owner is at the 
same time the manager and they have more than one ma ager. Also, they are characterized 
for being mostly family firms. 
 
For rating predictive indicator the sample shows that only 21% of observations for non-
defaulted firms have a higher commercial transaction risk. For defaulted firms this value is 
51%. Concerning Failure Score, both defaulted and non-defaulted firms have a higher 
                                                
7 Berger and Frame (2007) analyse the use of small business credit–scoring models by U.S. commercial 
banks. They conclude that to improve the model, it should be used at the same time information collected 
directly from the firm and business data provided by a commercial credit bureau (in this study, D&B). 
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percentage (91% and 80%, respectively) of firms which the probability of ends activity 
with loss over the next twelve months is higher. Although, the mean value for Failure 
Score2 for defaulted firms is higher than for non-defaulted firms.  
 
4.2. Logistic Regression 
 
Table 3 present the results of the logit regression. Appendix D shows the matrix of 
correlations. Regarding financial variables the results show that financial ratios have the 
expected sign that is, positive relation between P-NDF and the Profitability, Solvency, 
Liquidity, Coverage and Activity predictors and a negative relation between P-NDF and 
Leverage indicator. For the variable Collateral the results shows a significant positive sign 
which indicates that more collateral a firm has to pledge to the bank, the higher the P-NDF.  
 
Concerning the variable opaqueness the coefficient reports a negative sign indicating that 
SMEs with a higher ratio between Tangible fixed Asset  and Total Assets have a lower P-
NDF. This is an unexpected result. In line with Neub rger et al. (2008), industries with 
large tangible assets tend to be less opaque, and co sequently should report a lower 
probability of default. Nevertheless, one possible explanation is that these firms could 
suffer from liquidity constraints, especially in short term. 
 
Relating to Size, the results indicate that the P-NDF is higher when the firm’s size 
increases but this result is not significant at all. Butera and Faff (2006) report a similar 
result. Related to the Age, all dummies variables ar  statistically significant and report the 
expected sign. Thus, the firms that have between zero and ten years old influence 
negatively the P-NDF, indicating that smaller and younger firms are financially more 
constrained.  
 
For the variable number of bank relationships, the results show that firms with just one 
bank relationship have a higher probability of default. This result are in line with 
Neuberger and Räthke (2009) and suggests that firmswith more than one bank relationship 
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-2.338** 1.565
(2.230)
















































This table shows the results of model developed using all the variables (financial and non-financial) to 
predict the probability of non-default. The parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood method. Wald 
statistics are in parentheses. 
****Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 10%; **Significant at 15%; Significant at 20%. 
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Regarding the management quality and ownership the variable Ownership1 shows a 
positive and statically significant coefficient tha is when business owner is at the same 
time the manager the P-NDF is higher. This result sggests that the agency problems 
between owners and managers have a high weight in te probability of default for SMEs. 
Indeed, the subsistence of the owner depends on the success of the firm which means that 
he will avoid taking any decision that put the firm in risk. But when the firm is classified as 
a family firm, the results indicate that the probability of default is higher. One possible 
explanation relies on family differences and role conflict that can lead to behaviour that is 
not in the best interest of the firm. Moreover, family firms normally do not invest in risk 
projects losing good opportunities to grow into large and powerful firms (e.g., Kets de 
Vries (1993); Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). 
 
The predictive indicator Rating1 is not significant but positively influences the P-NDF. The 
Failure Score indicator is also positively related o P-NDF. Thus, the results show that 
firms with lower probability of end activity with loss over the next twelve months have a 
higher P-NDF. Concerning Paidex indicator and as expected, the results show a positive 
sign between Paidex6 and P-NDF that is firms for which the average delay of payments is 
lower than 30 days the P-NDF is higher. In turn, the variables Paidex2 and Paidex3 also 
show a positive sign, suggesting that that a firm can have a higher average delay of 
payments and the probability of default is lower. One possible explanation for this result is 
due the small number of observations for these variables (see Appendix C). 
 
4.3. Validation Results 
 
This section presents diagnostic and performance measur s related to the model estimated. 
To evaluate the quality of the forecast, this study uses the Receiver Operating 
Characteristic Curve (ROC). The model is better the larger the area under the curve is8.
                                                
8 The better the model is at discriminating, the closer the curve is to the top left of the chart and the larger the 
area which varies from 0 to 1 depending on the discriminatory ability of the model. The area under thecurve 
has probabilistic significance and indicates the probability of any non defaulting firm selected at random 
from the population will have a higher estimated score than any other defaulted firm, also randomly seect d. 
See Engelman et al. (2003) for more details. 
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Thus, the estimation provides by the study here reports 99% which means that the results 
are accurate (Appendix E shows the diagnostic plot of ROC Curve). To measure the 
accuracy of the model, this study calculates the Type I (2.55%) and Type II (12.20%) error 
rates.9 To calculate these percentages, the study here assume  an arbitrary cut-off rate of 
50% of the population.10  
 
To examine the joint predictive ability of all the independent variables in the model, this 
study analyses the Omnibus test of Model Coefficients. The p-value related to the model 
estimated (Table 3) of this test is found to be statistically significant (p-value=0). Thus, 
there is an adequate fit of the data to the model or at least one of the covariates is 
significantly related to the response variable. Next, the study here also considers the Cox & 
Snell’s R2 and the Nagelkerke R2 as a goodness of fit measures. The first one has a similar 
interpretation of multiple R-squared based on the log likelihood for the baseline model. 
Although, its maximum is usually less than 1. The Nagelkerke R2 test is a modification of 
the Cox and Snell’s R2 coefficient to assure that it can vary from zero to one. This test will 
normally be higher than Cox and Snell’s R2 but will tend to run lower than the 
corresponding OLS R2. For the model estimates, Cox and Snell’s and Nagelkerke measures 
are 0.461 and 0.840, respectively, which gives statistically robustness to the results 
estimated.   
 
To test if the model estimated adequately describes th  data, this study employs the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Test, also called the chi-square test. The result of the Hosmer-
Lemeshow is not statistically significant (pvalue=0,993), which means that the study here 
applies an appropriate statistical technique. Furthermore, and as suggested by Altman and 
Sabato (2007), the study here also analyses the delta chi-square versus probability of 
default as diagnostic plot to confirm the result of he Hosmer-Lemeshow test. Because the 
plot looks like an “X”, the performance of the model estimated is good. The following plot 
shows the results. 
                                                
9 Type I error is the percentage of observations clasified as ‘‘non-default’’ but which actually did default. 
Type II error is the percentage of observations clasified as ‘‘default’’ that actually did not default (Grunert et 
al, 2005). 
10 This means that all firms with a forecasted probability of non-default greater than 0.5 will be considered as 




Diagnostic Plot of Delta Chi-Square versus Predicte Probability 
 
The plot shows an approximation of the square residuals versus fitted values.  
 
4.4. Robustness Sample 
 
According to Lehmann (2003), the accuracy of the model estimated increases, if the 
sample comprises 1/3 of default observations and 2/3 of non-default observations. Thus, to 
validate the results the model from Table 3 was estimated using a sample of 300 defaulted 
observations and 600 non-defaulted observations. The results in terms of coefficients, 
Wald Test and Standard Errors are similar as for the initial sample and are presented in 
Appendix F. Table 4 summarizes the results in terms of diagnostic and performance 








Diagnostic and Performance Measures for Initial Sample and Robustness Sample 
 
Initial Sample Robustness Sample
Type I Error Rate 2.55% 2.64%
Type II Error Rate 12.20% 12.20%
-2 Log likelihood 56.24 56.18
Cox & Snell R Square 0.46 0.46
Nagelkerke R Square 0.84 0.84  
 
The Type I and Type II error rates for the robustnes sample are similar to initial model. 
The Cox & Snell’s R2 and the Nagelkerke R2 have the same values. The likelihood ratio (-
2LL) of the best-fitted model is minimal for the robustness sample. The Hosmer-
Lemeshow is also not statistically significant (pvalue=1).  The area under the ROC curve is 
also 99% like the initial model. Thus, we might conlude that the initial model leads to an 




Usually banks hesitate to provide credit to SMEs which means that they suffer from 
limited access to financial resources. Often this behavior is due to SMEs having difficult to 
signaling their qualities. These are typically asymmetric information problems between 
SMEs and banks. To avoid these problems SMEs can develop a relationship lending or a 
transaction lending with the bank. The use of a transactional lending technology like credit 
scoring models is a growing practice in the area of SMEs lending in particular with the 
publication of the New Basel Capital Accord in June 2004. This document at its most 
sophisticated IRB approach allows banks to employ its own estimates of the Probability of 
Default, the Expected Loss Given Default (LGD), theExposure at Default (EAD) and 
Maturity, as inputs in the regulatory model that determines the risk-weight.  
 
Many studies focus on modeling credit default in the bank perspective when analyzing the 
bank-customer relationship. This paper pretended to o the opposite that is to develop an 
adequate credit scoring model that could be used by SMEs. The objective is to improve the 
knowledge of Portuguese SMEs about their default risk. Using a panel data from a 
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representative sample of Portuguese SMEs, operating in Manufacturing of Food and 
Beverages, this paper develops a logit scoring model f r the prediction of default. First the 
study here analyses a complete set of financial ratios. Following a stepwise procedure the 
ratios that best explained the probability of default were selected. Then, to perform the 
scoring model this study uses at the same time the financial ratios selected and other non-
financial indicators. The results show that the probability of non-default within the next 
year is an increasing function of profitability, liquidity, coverage and activity, and a 
decreasing function of leverage. Concerning qualitative factors, smaller firms and firms 
with just one bank relationship have a higher probability of default. This result is 
consistent because normally smaller firms have a lower number of bank relationships. 
Moreover, the results show that firms that have more collateral to pledge to the bank and 
firms where the owner is at the same time the manager nd non-family firms have a lower 
probability of default. Additionally, firms with lower probability of end activity with loss 
over the next twelve months and when their average delay of payments is lower than 30 
days, have a higher probability of non-default. Sustain in the results of the ROC Curve and 
the Type I and Type II error rates, the study here concludes that the model developed is 
accurate.  
 
The main contribution of this paper is related to the model developed that it is a model 
which specially focuses on SMEs side. The model pretends that SMEs are well informed 
when they are going to get financing from commercial banks and “discuss” the interest rate 
in order to reduce information asymmetries and to av id that SMEs are credit rationing. 
Moreover, SMEs can recognize if the bank is applying a fair interest rate. Nevertheless, 
other factors such as the duration of the relationship banking, loan maturity, information 
about the firm’s owner (e.g., age and education), the presence of past credit problems and 
firm’s market position are some forward looking indicators that could improve the model. 
Furthermore, future research should apply the model taking into account that under the 









Appendix A  
Selection of Financial Ratios 
Category Ratios Examined
Financial Ratios  selected under a Stepwise 
Procedure
Financial Ratios Entered in 
the Model
Profit (loss) before Taxation / Total Sales Profit (loss) before Taxation / Total Sales
EBITDA/Total Assets EBITDA/Total Assets
EBIT/Total Assets EBIT/Total Assets
Gross Profit / Total Assets
EBIT/Total Assets
Cash Flow /Total Assets Cash Flow /Total Assets
Capital/Total Liabilities
Capital/Total Assets Capital/Total Assets
(Current Assets-Short-Term Liabilities) /
Total Assets
(Current Assets-Short-Term Liabilities) /
Total Assets
(Current Assets- Stocks)/Current Liabilities (Current Assets- Stocks)/Current Liabilities
Cash/Total Assets
Current Assets / Current Liabilities
Cash/Current Liabilities Cash/Current Liabilities
Working Capital /Total Assets Working Capital /Total Assets
Debt/Total Assets
Short Term Debt/ Total Liabilities
Total Liabilities/Total Assets
(Long-term debt + loans)/Total Liabilities
Interest Paid/Total Bank Debt
(Non-Current Liabilities + Loans)/Capital
Operating Profit (loss) /Interest Paid Operating Profit (loss) /Interest Paid
Net profit / Interest Expenses
EBITDA/Interest Expenses EBITDA/Interest Expenses
EBIT/Interest Expenses
Retained Earnings/Total Assets Retained Earnings/Total Assets




Interest Expensive / Total Liabilities
(Current Assets-Short-




Taxation / Total Sales
Solvency











This table shows the procedure of selection of the financial ratios that entered in the model. The first column 
describes the category of each ratio. The second column shows the candidate financial ratios. The third 
column presents the ratios selected after a forward stepwise procedure applied to each category. The column 
four shows the financial ratios entered in the final model.  
EBIT – Earnings before interests and taxes. 








Definition of Variables 
Variables Definition 
Dependent Variable
Probability of Non-Defaulted (P-NDF) Dummy that takes value 1 if borrowers non-default and 0 otherwise.
Independent Variables
Financial Ratios
Profitability Profit (loss) before taxation / Turnover
Solvency Cash Flow / Total Assets
Liquidity (Current Assets-Short-term liabilities)/ Total Assets
Leverage Debt / Total Assets
Coverage Operating Profit (loss) / Interest Paid
Activity Sales / Total Assets
Collateral Tangible Fixed Assets / Total Debt
Opaqueness Tangible Fixed Assets / Total Assets
Size Natural logarithm of Total Annual Turnover
Age
Age1
Dummy that takes value 1 if the company has between zero and five years old, and 0
otherwise.
Age2
Dummy that takes value 1 if the company has between six and tenyears old, and 0
otherwise.
Age3
Dummy that takes value 1 if the company has between eleven andfifteen years old,
and 0 otherwise.
Age4
Dummy that takes value 1 if the company has more than sixteen yars old, and 0
otherwise.
Number of Bank Relationships
Bank1 Dummy that takes value 1 if the company works with just one bank, and 0 otherwise.
Bank2
Dummy that takes value 1 if the company works with two or more banks, and 0
otherwise.
Management Quality and Ownership
Ownership1
Dummy that takes value 1 if the business owner is at the same time the manager, and
0 otherwise.
Ownership2
Dummy that takes value 1 if the company has more than one manager, nd 0
otherwise.
Family Firms Dummy that takes value 1 if the company is a family one, and 0 otherwise.
Predictive Indicators
Rating1
Dummy that takes value 1 if the company commercial transactions risk is lower, and
0 otherwise.
Rating2
Dummy that takes value 1 if the company commercial transactions risk is higher, and
0 otherwise.
Failure Score1
Dummy that takes the value 1 if the probability of a firm ends activity with loss over
the next twelve months is lower and 0 otherwise.
Failure Score2
Dummy that takes the value 1 if the probability of a firm ends activity with loss over
the next twelve months is higher and 0 otherwise.
Paidex1
Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm average delay of paymentsis unsatisfactory or
placed in collection, and 0 otherwise.
Paidex2
Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm average delay of paymentsis 180 days or more,
and 0 otherwise.
Paidex3
Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm average delay of paymentsis 90 days , and 0
otherwise.
Paidex4
Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm average delay of paymentsis 60 days, and 0
otherwise.
Paidex5
Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm average delay of paymentsis 30 days, and 0
otherwise.
Paidex6
Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm average delay of paymentsis 15 days, and 0
otherwise.
Paidex7
Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm average delay of paymentsis satisfactory or
cash, and 0 otherwise.
Paidex8
Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm average delay of paymentsis advanced or




Statistics of Probability of Non-Default and Probability of Default 
 
Panel A: Probability of Non-Default 




Dependent Variable 2121 1 1 2121 1.000 0.000 0.000
Independent Variables
Financial Ratios
Profitability 2082 -0.831 0.549 -4.979 -0.002 0.099 0.010 -2.471 15.988
Solvency 2087 -2.405 0.795 166.515 0.08 0.125 0.016 -3.799 78.078
Liquidity 2119 -4.077 0.949 -97.724 -0.046 0.418 0.175 -2.139 13.301
Leverage 1814 0.051 5.014 1341.130 0.739 0.388 0.150 3.849 29.42
Coverage 1485 -79.730 928.850 46484.400 31.303 107.308 11514.957 5.096 28.461
Activity 2098 0,001 14.375 3349.384 1.596 1.185 1.405 2.627 13.996
Collateral 1814 0.000 7.505 1313.901 0.724 0.648 0.420 3.678 22.805
Opaqueness 2116 0.000 0.955 902.486 0.427 0.223 0.050 0.150 -0.842
Size 2098 5.572 17.904 30004.324 14.301 1.385 1.917 0.118 0.363
Age
Age1 2113 0 1 221 0.105 0.306 0.094 2.586 4.692
Age2 2113 0 1 289 0.137 0.344 0.118 2.116 2.479
Age3 2113 0 1 334 0.158 0.365 0.133 1.876 1.521
Age4 2113 0 1 1269 0.601 0.490 0.240 -0.411 -1.833
Number of Bank Relationships
Bank1 1920 0 1 507 0.264 0.441 0.194 1.071 -0.853
Bank2 1920 0 1 1413 0.736 0.441 0.194 -1.071 -0.853
Management Quality and Ownership
Ownership1 2083 0 1 1310 0.629 0.483 0.233 -0.534 -1.716
Ownership2 2083 0 1 1784 0.856 0.351 0.123 -2.035 2.142
Family Firms 1888 0 1 1508 0.799 0.401 0.161 -1.491 0.224
Predictive Indicators
Rating1 2090 0 1 1651 0.790 0.407 0.166 -1.425 0.030
Rating2 2090 0 1 439 0.210 0.407 0.166 1.425 0.030
Failure Score1 2091 0 1 426 0.204 0.403 0.162 1.472 0,168
Failure Score2 2091 0 1 1665 0.796 0.403 0.162 -1.472 0,168
Paidex1 500 0 1 2 0.004 0.063 0.004 15.764 247.484
Paidex2 500 0 1 11 0.022 0.147 0.022 6.537 40.897
Paidex3 500 0 1 11 0.022 0.147 0.022 6.537 40.897
Paidex4 500 0 1 19 0.038 0.191 0.037 4.847 21.582
Paidex5 500 0 1 18 0.036 0.186 0.035 4.996 23.057
Paidex6 500 0 1 156 0.312 0.464 0.215 0.814 -1.343
Paidex7 500 0 1 274 0.548 0.498 0.248 -0.193 -1.970








Panel B: Probability of Default 




Dependent Variable 375 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Independent Variables
Financial Ratios
Profitability 368 -0.958 0.112 -39.300 -0.107 0.146 0.021 -2.500 8.607
Solvency 370 -0.807 1.573 -0.581 -0.002 0.155 0.024 2.019 31.441
Liquidity 375 -2.799 0.786 -140.232 -0.374 0.45 0.202 -1.592 5.230
Leverage 327 0.385 4.355 341.715 1.045 0.449 0.202 3.864 20.039
Coverage 342 -79.440 990.91 82.730 0.242 68.710 4721.095 12.296 162.689
Activity 374 0.003 7.706 530.816 1.419 1.199 1.437 1.984 5.626
Collateral 327 0.002 2.192 182.729 0.559 0.318 0.101 0.847 2.960
Opaqueness 374 0.002 0.947 194.088 0.519 0.239 0.057 -0.316 -0.837
Size 374 9.007 17.256 5165.949 13.813 1.243 1.545 0.177 0.739
Age
Age1 366 0 1 68 0.186 0.389 0.152 1622 0.636
Age2 366 0 1 48 0.131 0.338 0.114 2194 2.831
Age3 366 0 1 62 0.169 0.376 0.141 1.77 1.139
Age4 366 0 1 188 0.514 0.500 0.250 -0.055 -2.008
Number of Bank Relationships
Bank1 312 0 1 100 0.321 0.467 0.218 0.773 -1.412
Bank2 312 0 1 212 0.679 0.467 0.219 -0.773 -1.412
Management Quality and Ownership
Ownership1 363 0 1 239 0.658 0.475 0.226 -0.671 -1.559
Ownership2 363 0 1 291 0.802 0.399 0.159 -1.519 0.310
FamilyFirms 337 0 1 268 0.795 0.404 0.163 -1.47 0.162
Predictive Indicators
Rating1 364 0 1 177 0.486 0.500 0.250 0.055 -2.008
Rating2 364 0 1 187 0.514 0.500 0.250 -0.055 -2.008
Failure Score1 364 0 1 31 0.085 0.280 0.078 2.985 6.947
Failure Score2 364 0 1 333 0.915 0.280 0.078 -2.985 6.947
Paidex1 61 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paidex2 61 0 1 4 0.066 0.250 0.062 3.599 11.324
Paidex3 61 0 1 1 0.016 0.128 0.016 7.810 61
Paidex4 61 0 0 0 0 0 0
Paidex5 61 0 1 4 0.066 0.250 0.062 3.599 11.324
Paidex6 61 0 1 25 0.410 0.496 0.246 0.376 -1.923
Paidex7 61 0 1 27 0.443 0.501 0.251 0.237 -2.011








Matrix of Correlations 
Profitability Solvency Liquidity Leverage Coverage Activi y Collateral Opaqueness SizeAge1 Age2 Age3 Bank1 Ownership1                        Ownership2                        Familyfirms                       Rating1                        Failure Score1                Paidex2                           Paidex3                      Paidex4                           Paidex5                       Paidex6                       
Profitability 1.000
Solvency -0.385 1.000
Liquidity 0.317 -0.085 1.000
Leverage 0.159 -0.232 0.299 1.000
Coverage -0.044 0.041 0.573 -0.115 1.000
Activity -0.072 0.153 0.572 -0.151 0.766 1.000
Collateral 0.240 -0.143 0.590 0.662 0.510 0.352 1.000
Opaqueness -0.209 0.061 -0.559 -0.552 -0.581 -0.408 -0.975 1.000
Size 0.010 0.144 0.245 -0.004 0.366 0.160 0.269 -0.339 1.000
Age1 -0.187 -0.060 -0.378 0.122 -0.453 -0.365 -0.213 0.262 -0.139 1.000
Age2 0.013 -0.292 -0.347 -0.095 -0.386 -0.294 -0.261 0.296 -0.092 0.446 1.000
Age3 0.373 -0.119 0.399 -0.090 0.433 0.308 0.251 -0.300 0.419 -0.275 -0.002 1.000
Bank1 -0.101 0.062 -0.120 0.320 -0.239 -0.225 -0.016 0.090 -0.116-0.026 -0.055 -0.195 1.000
Ownership1                        0.135 0.062 0.582 -0.030 0.736 0.619 0.475 -0.576 0.602 -0.424 -0.370 0.520 -0.265 1.000
Ownership2                        0.240 -0.132 0.163 -0.026 -0.132 0.033 -0.123 0.209 -0.312 0.008 0.261 0.110 0.158 -0.194 1.000
Familyfirms                       -0.173 0.124 -0.466 -0.148 -0.470 -0.402 -0.485 0.526 -0.261 0.310 0.159 -0.296 0.204 -0.591 0.159 1.000
Rating1                        -0.062 -0.164 0.307 0.350 0.199 0.148 0.306 -0.314 0.246 -0.084 -0.146 -0.032 0.170 0.366 -0.231 -0.396 1.000
Failure Score1                0.127 -0.069 0.383 -0.383 0.504 0.454 0.078 -0.120 0.051 -0.621 -0.255 0.389 -0.282 0.381 0.239 -0.194 -0.143 1.000
Paidex2                           -0.030 0.061 0.384 0.010 0.382 0.379 0.293 -0.334 0.326 -0.214 -0.148 0.140 -0.057 0.414 -0.145 -0.233 0.426 0.205 1.000
Paidex3                           0.206 0.120 0.696 -0.040 0.650 0.659 0.408 -0.471 0.477 -0.393 -0.370 0.515 -0.305 0.758 0.077 -0.283 0.253 0.482 0.454 1.000
Paidex4                           0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Paidex5                           0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Paidex6                           0.000 0.162 0.502 -0.247 0.558 0.654 0.234 -0.296 0.056 -0.496 -0.365 0.426 -0.243 0.526 0.071 -0.063 -0.122 0.540 0.3010.667 0.000 0.000 1.000 









Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (ROC) for Estimated Model 
 
This plot shows that the results for the model estima ed are accurate as the area under the curve is 99% with 

















Estimated Model for Robustness Sample 



























Number of Bank Relationships
-2.314** 1.568
(2.178)
















































This table shows the robustness model developed using all the variables (financial and non-financial) to 
predict the probability of non-default. The unknown parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood. Wald 
statistics are in parentheses. 
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